



Design for failure: Software challenges of digital ecosystems

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St Andrews



- Small Scottish town, on the north-east coast of the UK
- Home of golf
- Scotland's oldest university (founded in 1413)
- Small university focusing on research and teaching excellence



Trust and dependability

- Trust is fundamental to business dealings
- Trust
 - ◆ Reputation and recommendation
 - Companies establish trust through reputation and recommendation
 - ◆ Regulation
 - Organisations are trusted because they are externally regulated
 - ◆ Dependability
 - Positive experiences lead to trust. If users of a system find that it meets their needs, is available when required and doesn't go wrong then they trust the system.



What is dependability?

- System dependability is a critical factor in delivering a high quality of service
 - ◆ Availability. Is the system up and running?
 - ◆ Reliability. Does the system produce correct results?
 - ◆ Integrity. Does the system protect itself and its data from damage?
 - ◆ Confidentiality. Does the system ensure that information is only accessed by agents authorised agents?
 - ◆ Timeliness. Are the system responses produced within the required time frame?



Why dependability?

- Dependability is a major factor in establishing reputation and brand.
- In e-business systems, undependability leads to loss of confidence, business and revenue.
- Dependability is necessary for a service to be trusted by its users.



Achieving system dependability




- Fault avoidance
 - ◆ Detailed analysis of specification
 - ◆ Extensive reviews and testing of system
 - ◆ Careful configuration control
- Fault tolerance
 - ◆ Redundancy
 - Additional capacity that can be used in the event of failure
 - ◆ Diversity
 - Different ways of doing things




Business system engineering

System





Process





Top-down software engineering



- System vision
- Single specification
- Control of changes
- Complicated but not complex
- Client-contractor-sub-contractor relationships
- 'Clear' assignment of responsibilities
- Scope for whole-system analysis
- Trusted parties in collaboration



Ownership and control

- In top-down software engineering, a single organisation owns all parts of the system:
- Specification
 - ◆ Architecture and services offered can be controlled
- Instantiation
 - ◆ Engineering process can be controlled
- Deployment
 - ◆ Use can be controlled
- Evolution
 - ◆ Changes can be controlled



Ownership and dependability

- There is a close relationship between ownership (control) and dependability
- The more that is under the control of a single owner, the easier it is to produce dependable systems
 - ◆ Dependability through process
 - Fault avoidance
 - ◆ Dependability by design
 - Fault tolerance



Digital business ecosystems

- “A distributed environment that can support the spontaneous evolution and composition of software services, components, and applications”.
- DBEs are socio-technical entities that are not just populated by digital species
 - ◆ They include organisations, people, processes, regulations, etc.
 - ◆ Social, economic and political considerations are as important as technical issues.



Software engineering in a DBE

- System of systems.
- System instantiation involves cooperation and communication between entities in the ecosystem.
- Dynamic system re-configuration
 - ◆ The entities in the ecosystem evolve and become more/less suitable for some applications.
- Ecosystem evolution
 - ◆ The ecosystem itself exhibits a degree of self-organising behaviour. Applications may have to adapt to changes in the underlying environment.



Application ownership in a DBE

- Specification
 - ◆ Constrained by capabilities and entities of DBE
- Instantiation
 - ◆ Many owners of different parts of the system
 - ◆ The self-organising nature of the DBE means that the system owner has only partial control.
- Deployment
 - ◆ May be influenced by self-organising nature of DBE
- Evolution
 - ◆ Uncontrollable!




System failure



- Failure is inevitable.
- Failure is generally due to some conjunction of environmental effects which system designers have not considered.
- There are a huge number of possibilities and, eventually, if a system can fail, it will.
- Time to market pressures for new systems increase the chances of system failure.



DBE technology stack





Technical failures in DBEs

- Infrastructure failure
 - ◆ Technology infrastructure is unavailable/corrupt
- Data failure
 - ◆ Required data is incorrect or unavailable
- Knowledge failure
 - ◆ Required knowledge does not exist, is unavailable, is incomplete or is incorrect
- Service failure
 - ◆ DE components are faulty/unavailable
- RAD support failure
 - ◆ RAD run-time system is faulty
 - ◆ Application composition mechanism is faulty
 - ◆ Application composition is faulty



Security failures in DBEs

- Malicious component
 - ◆ Deliberate interference with the functioning of the application system
- Malicious data and knowledge
 - ◆ Deliberate introduction of incorrect data/knowledge
- Insecure infrastructure
 - ◆ DBE infrastructure is compromised by malicious components
- Insecure component
 - ◆ Digital 'species' is compromised by malicious code



Socio-technical systems






Coping with failure

- Socio-technical systems are remarkably robust because people are good at coping with unexpected situations when things go wrong.
 - ◆ We have the unique ability to apply previous experience from different areas to unseen problems.
 - ◆ Processes are designed to recognise and deal with exceptions.
 - ◆ We often have channel redundancy ie email, phone, walk up and talk.
 - ◆ Information is held in diverse forms (paper, electronic). Failure of software does not mean that information is unavailable.
- Coping with failure often involves 'breaking the rules'.



Consequences of automation



- Increasing automation reduces minor human error but makes it more difficult to cope with serious failures
- Rules enforced by system
 - ◆ Lead to dependability by catching failures and errors.
 - ◆ But it makes it harder to break the rules.
- Information redundancy is minimised
 - ◆ There is a single copy of information, maintained by the system and inaccessible in the event of failure.



What's different about DBEs

- Many rules enforced in different ways by different systems.
- No single manager or owner of the system
 - ◆ Who do you call when failures occur?
- Information is distributed - users may not be aware of where information is located, who owns information, etc..
- Probable blame culture
 - ◆ Owners of components will blame other components for system failure. Learning is inhibited and trust compromised.



Dependability challenges

- Trust and confidence
- Reasoning about DBEs
- Fault tolerance and recovery
- Self-organisation
- Socio-technical reconfiguration



Trust in technology

- Provenance
 - ◆ Who are the suppliers of the technology? What business environment do they operate in?
- Transparency
 - ◆ What information is available about the operation, structure and implementation of the technology?
- Predictability
 - ◆ Does the technology behave in the way we expect each time that we use it? Is it dependable?



Trusting systems of systems

- What mechanisms do we need to convince ourselves that DBEs and application systems in these DBEs are trustworthy and dependable
 - ◆ New approaches to constructing dependability arguments because existing approaches are designed for top-down software engineering
 - ◆ Methods and tools for testing DBE infrastructures and configurations
 - ◆ Self-aware systems that make information about their operation and failure available for scrutiny and use
 - ◆ Regulatory and social mechanisms to ensure that undependable and untrustworthy elements of the system are excluded from the DBE



Reasoning about DBEs

- We need to be able to reason about DBE configurations to convince ourselves that they are 'good enough'
 - ◆ What abstractions should be used to represent DBEs?
 - ◆ How do we express assumptions about DBE instances and how do we monitor the DBE to ensure that these assumptions remain valid?
 - ◆ How do current approaches to risk analysis need to evolve to reason about system risks?



Fault tolerance

- The DBE has the potential to be a fault-tolerant execution environment as it may contain multiple diverse instances of the same service.
 - ◆ What mechanisms are required to create fault-tolerant configurations?
 - ◆ How are faults automatically detected?
 - ◆ How do we recognise redundant and diverse services?
 - ◆ How do we handle partial computations and compensating actions?



Self-organising DBEs

- It has been suggested that DBEs will have some degree of self-organisation where the system will organise itself without human intervention.
- How do we know that each possible reorganisation is trustworthy?
- Does the reorganisation optimise service to the community or to an individual?
- How do we ensure that QoS to a community member is not unacceptably degraded?
- How do we know that each possible instance of the DBE conforms to regulations?



Socio-technical reconfiguration

- To cope with failure, DBEs must have the capacity to dynamically reconfigure themselves to replace automated with non-automated components.
 - ◆ How do we describe failures that might be solved by socio-technical reconfiguration? How do we recognise the symptoms of these failures?
 - ◆ How do we find a person with the appropriate knowledge to address the problem?
 - ◆ How do we ensure that they are provided with the necessary information and access to resources to solve the problem?



Conclusions



- DBEs offer an opportunity to radically change the business environment for SMEs.
- Their adoption is dependent on users trusting the resultant socio-technical systems.
- **Failure** by researchers and practitioners to design for **failure** will inevitably lead to the **failure** of the vision of digital business ecosystems.